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NOTES
Entrevia v. Hood: Back to Loescher v. Parr
Andrea Entrevia received injuries when the rear steps of a farmhouse
owned by A. E. Hood collapsed as she descended them. The farmhouse,
which had no electricity, was remotely located, unoccupied, surrounded
by a fence, and posted with "no trespassing" signs. Entrevia had entered
Hood's property with neither Hood's permission nor his knowledge. En-
trevia sued Hood in strict liability under Louisiana Civil Code articles
2317 and 2322 for her injuries. After considering relevant moral, economic,
and social circumstances, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Hood
was not strictly liable because Entrevia failed to prove that the defective
steps posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Entrevia v. Hood,
427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 through 2324 provide the scheme
for delictual liability in Louisiana. The major principle is set out in arti-
cle 2315, which provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Articles
2316 through 23'24 expand on the notion of fault and indicate cir-
cumstances under which one may be liable for his own acts or the act
of persons or things for which he is responsible.' Originally, the courts
defined fault under article 2315 as negligence.2 Reasoning that article 2315
modified article 2317, the supreme court required proof of negligence for
recovery under article 2317.1
Loescher v. Parr' was the first case in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that proof of negligence is not required for recovery under
Civil Code article 2317.' The court in Loescher, after reviewing similar
French Civil Code articles and other Louisiana Civil Code articles which
the court held established a strict liability standard, imposed liability on
Copyright 1984, by LOUISlANA LAw REv-Ew.
1. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
2. See, e.g., Lyons v. Jahncke Serv., 125 So. 2d 619, 627 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960);
See also Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV.
357, 384 (1973). Later in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d
133 (1971), the supreme court held that fault under 2315 was not limited to negligence.
3. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 338, 223 So. 2d 822, 825 (1969).
The court in Cartwright noted that it had previously held that article 2321 must be read
in conjunction with article 2315 so as to require proof of negligence of an animal owner
for recovery for injuries caused by his animal. See Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 74,
165 So. 453, 455-56 (1936).
4. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). For developments in strict liability leading up to Loescher,
see Tunc, Louisiana Tort Law at the Crossroads, 48 Ttm. L. REV. 1111, 1112-15 (1974).
5. Article 2317 provides: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned
by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are
answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be understood
with the following modifications."
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the owner of a tree which was ninety percent rotten on the inside, but
which appeared sound on the outside, for damages resulting when the
tree fell on a neighbor's Cadillac.' Liability resulted because the plain-
tiff proved that the thing (a tree) was in the defendant's custody, that
a defect (an unreasonable risk of harm) was present in the tree, and that
damage resulted through this defect. 7 The owner could not escape liability
from his "legal fault in maintaining the defective tree and in preventing
its vice from causing injury, unless he proved that -the damage was caused
by the fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an
irresistible force."'
The court in Loescher reasoned that including the fault of a custo-
dian of a thing for damage resulting from its defect without regard to
the custodian's due care under Civil Code article 2317 is consistent with
the scheme of fault set out by companion code articles.9 In summarizing
6. 324 So. 2d at 449. The court in Loescher noted that French Civil Code articles
1382-1386 from which article 2317 was an almost verbatim translation imposed a similar
liability on the guardian of a thing, without proof of personal fault on his part. The court
also noted that it had previously applied the concept of "legal fault without personal
negligence" under Civil Code articles 2318, 2320, 2321, and 2322. The court particularly
noted recent decisions such as Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975), and Holland
v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974) which, upon an examination of the codal scheme
of liability, imposed strict liability under articles 2318 and 2321, respectively. Under the
theory of these cases the plaintiff need not prove that the custodian of the dog or child
was negligent (i.e., failed to use reasonable care); neither could the defendant escape liabil-
ity by offering evidence of his due care.
7. 324 So. 2d at 449.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 449; see supra note 6. Civil Code article 2318 provides: "The father, or
after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor
or unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other
persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons. The same responsibility attaches
to the tutors of minors." Civil Code article 2320 provides:
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their ser-
vants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.
Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage caused by their scholars
or apprentices, while under their superintendence.
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers,
teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which caused the damage,
and have not done it.
Civil Code article 2321 provides:
The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage he has caused; but if
the animal had been lost, or had strayed more than a day, he may discharge
himself from his responsibility, by abandoning him to the person who has sus-
tained the injury; except where the master has turned loose a dangerous or nox-
ious animal, for then he must pay for all the harm done, without being allowed
to make the abandonment.
Civil Code. article 2322 provides: "The owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result
of a vice in its original construction."
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the principles of legal fault underlying Civil Code articles 2318, 2320, 2321,
and 2322 and extending these principles to Civil Code article 2317, the
court explained the theory of strict liability and the policy upon which
an imposition of strict liability under article 2317 is based. According to
this theory of liability, a person legally responsible under the code ar-
ticles, such as the custodian of a thing, is liable for harm resulting from
a defect of the thing which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others,
even in the absence of any proof of negligence or inattention on the defen-
dant's part."° The liability arises from the custodian's legal relationship
with the thing, and his fault is "based upon his failure to prevent the
person or thing for whom he is responsible from causing such unreasonable
risk of injury to others."" The policy behind this imposition of liability
is that the person recognized as the risk-creator, rather than an innocent
victim, should bear the loss resulting from the risk-creator's failure to
prevent an unreasonable risk of harm. 2
Thus, because of the policy and theory underlying article 2317, the
plaintiff must prove only that the thing was in the defendant's custody,
that it had a defect, and that the damage resulted from this defect. He
need not prove negligence or inattention on the defendant's part, as it
is the unreasonable risk created by the thing, not the defendant's due
care in maintaining the thing, which should be considered.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hunt v. City Stores 3 reiterated the
Loescher theory of strict liability in finding that an escalator, which in-
jured a small boy whose tennis shoe was caught in the escalator's side
panel, presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The court noted that,
although a finding of unreasonableness is traditionally necessary to a deter-
mination of negligence, it is also necessary for a determination of strict
liability under Civil Code article 2317." Hunt thus indicated that a bal-
ancing of the magnitude of risk against the utility of a thing is appropriate
in a strict liability case." However, Hunt did not change the plaintiff's
10. 324 So. 2d at 446. The court noted that under these articles the jurisprudence has
established that
the injured person must prove the vice (i.e., unreasonable risk of injury to another)
in the person or thing whose act causes the damage, and that the damage resulted
from this vice. Once this is proved, the owner or guardian responsible for the
person or thing can escape liability only if he shows the harm was caused by
the fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force.
Id. at 446-47.
11. Id. at 446.
12. Id.; see Tate, The Interpretation of Written Rule of Law, 27 LA. B.J. 79, 82,
85 (1979) (writing that the Loescher decision is based on policy reasons which the court
took into implicit consideration but did not articulate in its decision).
13. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).
14. Id. at 588.
15. Id. The court in Hunt distinguished between the strict liability and negligence theories
of liability by explaining that the "inability of a defendant to know or prevent the risk
19841 1487
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burden of proof or the defendant's available defenses because under the
Loescher standard, as Hunt recognized, the plaintiff must prove the
unreasonable risk of harm created by the thing but not the
unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct in maintaining it.' 6
The theory of fault underlying Civil Code article 2317 and the policy
behind it thus support the basic evidentiary distinction between strict liabil-
ity and negligence set out in Loescher and maintained in Hunt. This eviden-
tiary distinction is important because, in the adversary litigation process,
"[tihe increasing or diminishing of the defendant's or the plaintiff's burden
of proof often has more effect on the compensation of a given injury
than does the statement of the legal theory itself."' 7
These evidentiary considerations made the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co." disconcerting because the
decision marked a change in the plaintiff's burden of proof, or at least
the defendant's available defenses, in a strict liability action under article
2317. The court in Kent decided that in a strict liability case under article
2317, "the standard for determining liability is to presume the owner's
knowledge of the risk presented by the thing under his control and then
to determine the reasonableness (according to traditional notions of
blameworthiness) of the owner's conduct, in the light of that presumed
knowledge." 9 The only distinction between strict liability and negligence
under the court's analysis is that in strict liability the plaintiff need not
prove that the custodian knew or should have known of the risk involved. 0
Under this standard, the court found that article 2317 was not helpful
in determining whether Gulf States Utilities Co. (Gulf States) should be
liable to Kent, who was electrocuted when the long metal-handled rake
he was using on a construction site came into contact with Gulf States'
power lines, because Gulf States already knew of the risk presented to
a person working near those lines with a grounded object."
The court, having found that Gulf States already knew of the risk,
decided that its liability as custodian of a thing depended upon the
reasonableness of its conduct in protecting others from this risk of harm.
The court recognized that this is basically the same determination as that
made in a negligence case and examined the defendant's conduct to deter-
is not a defense in a strict liability case but precludes a finding of negligence." Id. For
discussion that this is not the only distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
16. Crawford, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Torts, 43 LA. L. REV. 607, 608
(1982); Comment, Does Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles
2317, 2318, and 2321?, 40 LA. L. REv. 207, 219 (1979).
17. Crawford, supra note 16, at 609.
18. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
19. Id. at 497.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 498.
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mine whether Gulf States took "reasonable steps" to prevent this par-
ticular risk of harm.22 Taking into account the unusual combination of
circumstances which led up to the accident, the court decided that Gulf
States took reasonable steps because it met minimum clearance standards,
insulated its lines by isolation, attended meetings concerning the construc-
tion, and moved its poles to accommodate the construction.2 3 The court
termed the reasonableness of Gulf States' conduct as the "bottom line"
in resolving the issue of Gulf States' liability.24
If the "bottom line" for determining liability once knowledge is
presumed or found is the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, Kent
seems to have made a marked departure from the theory of liability under
article 2317 as set out in Loescher, which had done away with any re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted unreasonably.2"
The result of this departure from Loescher was an increase in the plain-
tiff's burden of proof or at least in the defendant's available defenses.
The court again addressed the problem of the plaintiff's burden of
proof in the instant case26 and reestablished the Loescher standard. In
Entrevia, the supreme court agreed with the trial court, which found that
flaws in the steps which collapsed did not amount to an unreasonable
risk of injury to others, and reversed the court of appeal which had
awarded damages solely because the plaintiff proved the steps caused her
injuries. 27 After reviewing the Loescher summary of principles of legal
fault underlying Civil Code articles 2317 and 2322 and quoting at length
the essential language of Loescher, the court concluded that, in order to
recover under these articles, the plaintiff must prove that "the building
or its appurtenances posed an unreasonable risk of injury to others, and
that his damage occurred through this risk."'"
Before applying the unreasonable risk of harm criterion to the facts
of the case, the court explained that it is not a criterion to be mechanically
applied,29 but rather is a concept used to symbolize the Civil Code judicial
process.3" The court recognized that, although strict liability under article
22. Id. at 498-99.
23. Id. at 499.
24. Id.
25. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446. Professor Crawford stated:
It is not clear from the [Kent] opinion whether the defendant's failure to use
care is an element of the plaintiff's burden of proof in making a prima facie
case, or whether the defendant's failure to use care is presumed, allowing the
defendant to make out a defense by proving due care.
Crawford, supra note 16, at 607 n.4.
26. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
27. 413 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at 1148. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
29. Id. at 1149.
30. Id.
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2317 is not equivalent to negligence, the judicial process of determining
the reasonableness of the risk of harm is the same in negligence and strict
liability because in both the judge deciding a particular case must con-
sider questions of social utility much as a legislator does. 3 The court ex-
plained that because of these similarities, the court in Kent had suggested
an approach which presumed knowledge of the risk and then assessed
the reasonableness of the owner's conduct. However, the Entrevia court
concluded that this approach was indirect and totally "unnecessary once
the judge understands that the standards or patterns of utility and morality
which he must consider in deciding if a risk is unreasonable will be found
in the life of the community, in the same way they will be found by
the legislator."' 2 The court emphasized that it did not mean to suggest
that the methods of determining negligence and strict liability are the same
in every aspect."
In reaching its conclusion that the steps which collapsed and injured
the plaintiff were not unreasonably dangerous, the court addressed rele-
yant moral, social, and economic considerations inherent in the
unreasonable risk of harm criterion. The court considered several cir-
cumstances: the steps were located in the rear of an old farmhouse on
remotely located property and presented no risks other than those typically
associated with such buildings; Entrevia's unauthorized entry was both
legally and morally reprehensible; owners of such property are not in a
position to bear the risks of loss posed by such property and spread them
among the community; laws which would require the owner to either
destroy or undertake restoration of such property are not economically
or socially desirable. In light of these considerations, the court concluded
that "the magnitude of the risk posed and the gravity of harm threatened
were small in comparison with that of other risks presented by things
in our society.' 34
Thus, although the court did invoke a balancing process to determine
the reasonableness of the risk, it did not address the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct, nor did it employ the Kent presumption of
knowledge. 3 The court instead determined the reasonableness of the risk
posed by the thing itself in light of relevant policy considerations.'.
Therefore, under the court's analysis in Entrevia, like that in Loescher,
in order to recover in strict liability under article 2317 against the custo-
dian of a thing, the plaintiff must prove that the thing presented an
31. Id. at 1149-50.
32. Id. at 1150.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For what should happen to Kent now, see infra text between notes 45-46.
36. Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1150; see Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, 703 F.2d 921,
925 (5th Cir. 1983).
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unreasonable risk of injury to others and that damage resulted through
this risk. The owner is then responsible unless he can show that the damage
resulted from the fault of a third person, the fault of the victim, or an"
irresistible force. 37
Entrevia correctly recognized that the determination of
unreasonableness of risk is similar in strict liability under article 2317 and
in negligence. Additionally, it correctly recognized that the two actions
are not identical in all respects.3" In attempting to explain the difference
between the two theories, however, the court made a distinction which
may be misleading. The court in Entrevia explained: "There is a major
distinction between the two theories of recovery which lies in the fact
that the inability of the defendant to know or prevent the risk is not
a defense in a strict liability case but precludes a finding of negligence.." 3 9
When the court first noted the distinction in Hunt v. City Stores,40 it
cited this difference as the distinction between the two theories of recovery
rather than as a major distinction. The Hunt opinion thus implied that
no other distinctions exist. However, the law review comment ' cited in
Hunt as authority for such a proposition made the distinction in regard
to the constituent elements of reasonableness, not as an exhaustive com-
parison of the two theories of recovery. Proposing this distinction as the
sole difference between the two theories of recovery, as the Hunt court
did, is misleading because one might conclude that although inability-to
know or prevent the risk of harm is not a defense in strict liability,
evidence of the defendant's due care in attempting to prevent the risk'
is admissible in defense to a strict liability action as well as to a negligence
action. Allowing evidence of due care in defense to a strict liability ac-
tion would ignore the basic evidentiary character of strict liability.
Since the court in Entrevia cited this distinction as a major one, and
not as the only one, the court may have recognized that other differences,
such as the admissibility of evidence of the defendant's due care, exist
between the two theories of recovery. Additionally, the opinion as a whole
indicates that the court's noting of this distinction should not be inter-
preted to allow introduction of evidence of the defendant's due care. En-
trevia recognized that the defendant's fault under strict liability "is based
upon his failure to prevent the person or thing for whom he is responsi-
ble from causing such unreasonable risk of injury to others.""2 The defen-
dant's due care in attempting to prevent the risk is thus irrelevant to his-
37. Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1149; Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446-47.
38. 427 So. 2d at 1150.
39. Id.
40. 387 So. 2d 585, 588 (La. 1980), discussed supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
41. Comment, Fault of the Victim: The Limits of Liability Under Civil Code Articles
2317, 2318, and 2321, 38 LA. L. REv. 995, 1013 (1978).
42. 427 So. 2d at 1148 (quoting Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446).
19841 1491
2LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
liability. The supreme court had characterized correctly the defendant's
liability in Jones v. City ofBaton Rouge: "Because the responsibility for
preventing the unreasonable risk of injury to others is unconditional, the
injured party seeking damages under article 2317 need not prove that any
particular act or omission on the part of the defendant caused his
injuries."' 3
By analyzing the facts of the case as it did, recognizing that the Kent
approach was both indirect and unnecessary, relying on the Loescher sum-
mary of strict liability principles, and recognizing that distinctions exist
between strict liability and negligence, the court in Entrevia returned to
strict liability as explained in Loescher. It reestablished that the plain-
tiff's burden of proof under article 2317 does not include a showing of
the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct and that a showing of
due care is not admissible as a matter of defense. Since it returned to
the Loescher burden of proof, Entrevia should dispel the confusion
engendered by Kent. For example, the first circuit in B. Olinde & Sons,
Inc. v. State" cited Loescher's unreasonable risk of harm standard as
the standard for liability in an action under article 2317, yet, after review-
ing Kent, determined that its task was to decide "whether the defendants'
actions or lack thereof in attempting to prevent the risk of harm were
unreasonable under traditional notions of blameworthiness."' 5 Entrevia
should make clear that the court's task is not to determine whether the
defendant's conduct was reasonable, but is instead to determine whether
the thing in the defendant's custody presented an unreasonable risk of
harm. Perhaps it would have been desirable for the court expressly to
overrule Kent since attempts to distinguish between strict liability and
negligence using the Kent presumption have led to confusion." However,
43. 388 So. 2d 737, 739 (La. 1980) (emphasis added).
44. 421 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 375.
46. A comparison of cases decided before and after Kent demonstrates that Kent's
presumption was more than a semantic change. For example, in Jones v. City of Baton
Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980), which was decided before Kent, the plaintiff recovered
from the defendant in strict liability because she proved that the catch-basin which caused
her injuries was in the defendant's custody and that the catch-basin cover presented an
unreasonable risk of harm. The court correctly recognized that the defendant's responsibil-
ity to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm is unconditional. See supra text accompanying
note 43. However, in B. Olinde & Sons, Inc. v. State, 421 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982), which was decided after Kent, the court did not address the unreasonableness of
the risk of harm posed by the shoulder of a highway under construction. Instead, the court
determined that the defendant's conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Morgan v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981), which was
decided before Kent, and Miller v. Broussard, 430 So. 2d 330 (La-. App. 3d Cir. 1983),
which was decided after Kent, addressed the question of whether a step down in a building
in the defendant's custody created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In Morgan,
the court noted that "[a]n injured party seeking damages under art. 2317 need not prove
1492 [Vol. 44
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Entrevia did indicate that the Kent approach was unnecessary and did
not address the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct; it may thus
be interpreted as repudiating the Kent approach.4 7
The court's return to the Loescher standard renders the plaintiff's
burden of proof in accord with the policy of strict liability that the risk
creator, rather than the innocent victim, should bear the loss resulting
from the risk creator's failure to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm.4 8
This standard is also in accord with the theory of fault of Civil Code
article 2317 because it bases the defendant's fault upon his failure to pre-
vent the unreasonable risk of harm posed by the thing in his custody
rather than upon the unreasonableness of his conduct."9 Similarly, it avoids
the logical inconsistency of having reasonable conduct create an
negligence, that is, that any particular act or omission on the part of the defendant caused
his injuries." 402 So. 2d at 641 (quoting Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727,
728 (La. 1981)). On the other hand, in Miller the court stated:
We find that the trial judge erred in concluding that the step down presented
an unreasonable risk of harm based solely on the above facts [expert's testimony]
without considering whether Mr. Broussard took reasonable steps under the cir-
cumstances to protect against the risk that a person would be unable to perceive
the change in the elevation and fall.
430 So. 2d at 333.
47. Attempts to apply both the Kent and the Entrevia standards may also end in con-
fusion. See, e.g., Robinson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983),
in which the court cited both Kent and Entrevia but misstated Entrevia's standard: "Whether
the nursing home's liability is founded in strict liability type of fault or in negligence, the
legal analysis is similar and concerns the reasonableness of the conduct of the nursing home
employees in maintaining a reasonable safe place for its patients and visitors." Id. at 488.
Another example of the confusion resulting from the Kent approach is Bridges v. Chemrex
Specialty Coatings, 704 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff, claiming that the defendant
had knowledge of the risk (the only distinction between strict liability and negligence under
the Kent approach), objected to the jury's verdict as inconsistent "because it is impossible
under Louisiana law to find for a defendant under a strict liability claim and yet be unable
to reach a verdict on the negligence claim." Id. at 180. Certainly under the Kent approach
his argument is sound. It should be impossible for a jury to find no unreasonable risk
under strict liability when knowledge is presumed, and be unable to decide on the negligence
issue in which inability to know is a defense. The court agreed that this result is inconsis-
tent but explained that any confusion in the law of Louisiana in strict liability was to the
injury of the defendant and not the plaintiff, as "[lit is the defendant who could raise
a substantial issue under Louisiana law as to whether it could still be liable under a negligence
claim after being exonerated under a strict liability claim." Id. at 180. On the other hand,
the court in Farr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 430 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
correctly applied Entrevia's standard. Though citing both Entrevia and Kent, the court ap-
proached the problem from the standpoint of the risk presented by the thing itself, not
on the basis of the defendant's conduct, and concluded that an uneven surface in a dirt
and gravel parking lot which accumulated water posed no unreasonable risk of harm. Another
example of a correct application of Entrevia is Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, 703 F.2d
921 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
48. Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1148; Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446.
49. See cases cited supra note 48.
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unreasonable risk of harm. 0 Moreover, by requiring that the plaintiff,
in order to prevail under article 2317, prove not just a mere defect, but
rather a defect which poses an unreasonable risk of harm, Entrevia pro-
tects the custodian and society since the unreasonable risk of harm criterion
requires the consideration of relevant moral, social, and economic
circumstances.I'
Entrevia, therefore, was a necessary and desirable decision. Its possibly
misleading statement that the major distinction between strict liability and
negligence is that inability to know or prevent a risk is not a defense
in strict liability but precludes a finding of negligence is countered by
the opinion itself, which did not address the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's conduct. Likewise, its failure expressly to overrule Kent should not
create confusion, since the court deemed the Kent approach indirect and
unnecessary. Under Entrevia's own balancing test, the utility of the case
far outweighs the few problems present in the decision. Entrevia is a useful
and important decision because it focuses on the unreasonable risk of
harm presented by the thing itself and not on the defendant's conduct.
This focus brings the burden of proof back in line with the policy and
theory of fault underlying article 2317 strict liability. Entrevia, by em-
phasizing the unreasonable risk of harm criterion as set out in Loescher,
protects the innocent victim; by emphasizing the balancing test inherent
in this criterion, it protects the custodian of the thing from liability for
defects which society does not view as unreasonable.
Elizabeth Baucum
50. Crawford, supra note 16, at 610.
51. 427 So. 2d at 1149-50. The Loescher approach does not automatically result in
a determination of unreasonableness of risk. See Entrevia, 427 So. 2d 1146; Broussard v.
Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 574 (La. 1981); Goodlow v. City of Alexan-
dria, 407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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